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I. Introduction
This study presents new evidence on the impact of Medicare Part D and the effect of prescription drug coverage expansion on mortality. There are several reasons to believe that the reform may have had an impact on mortality. Nearly half of drug expenditures are spent on treatments to prevent cardiovascular-related deaths. These drugs include some of the most innovative and effective treatments for preventing heart disease, the leading cause of death in the United States. Second, the act improved the affordability of prescription drugs. The financial incentives from expanding drug insurance may be particularly important because pre-reform prescription drugs accounted for around 42 percent of outof-pocket spending, even though drugs accounted for just 18 percent of total medical expenditures. In addition, numerous studies have shown that financial incentives encourage the chronically ill to start treatment and also improve adherence to medications (Eaddy et al. 2012; Solomon et al. 2009; Cutler and Everett 2010) .
By contrast, Medicare Part D may have had only a limited effect on mortality, if, for instance, those individuals in need of prescription drugs had already purchased prescription drug insurance before the reform. That is, the impact on mortality of prescription drug coverage expansion is likely to be less than under random assignment. Overall, there is little evidence on whether Medicare Part D had any impact on the mortality rate of elderly individuals.
Our identification strategy relies on geographic differences in insurance coverage across US counties before the reform. Using the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), we estimate demographically adjusted rates of prescription drug coverage for age 65+ Medicare enrollees across counties before the implementation of Part D. We find that those areas with lower levels of coverage before the reform experienced greater drug insurance expansion as a result of Part D. This information is combined with county-level mortality data obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for the years 2000 to 2010. We then examine whether those areas most impacted by the reform have a larger reduction in mortality after the reform.
While this type of geographic variation has been employed in other studies, 1 there are a few additional factors introduced in this study that are critical for identifying the effects on mortality. First, it is important to analyze the effects of mortality by disease category. We focus on measuring the effects of mortality on two categories: (1) cardiovascular-related conditions (e.g., heart disease, stroke, and heart attacks) and (2) all other conditions (e.g., cancers and pneumonia). We find strong persistence in the disease-specific cause of death within counties over time, implying county disease fixed effects are important for accounting for the health across these populations.
Second, it is essential to consider how the reform affects the population's health in future periods. If drug insurance expansion is successful it will improve the survival of those who would have died without the reform-that is, those with relatively poor health. This implies that in subsequent periods the population of individuals living with a serious chronic health condition will increase, which may affect mortality rates in future years. This effect is likely to be more pronounced for chronic conditions and especially in those counties where Part D had a stronger impact on mortality. This type of dynamic effect, which we call "delayed mortality, " is crucial when studying health care and mortality in the United States because chronic conditions cause 7 out of 10 deaths each year. 2 We present two alternative strategies for measuring the impact of the reform, which both address the delayed-mortality issue. One approach is to focus on the immediate impact of the reform just after implementation. Given that this is the population that is initially affected by the reform, it is most comparable to the health of the population prior to the reform. Specifically, we focus on the mortality effects for those dying immediately following the reform from July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007 3 The second approach measures the effect on mortality for the entire post-period of our sample from 2006 to 2010, but includes controls designed to remove the effects of delayed mortality. That is, we estimate a model that accounts for dynamic effects of the reform.
Across a range of estimates, we find that the mortality rate for a cardiovascular-related cause of death drops significantly, while mortality rates for noncardiovascular causes of death remain statistically unchanged. Estimates suggest that between 7,000 and 26,000 more individuals were alive in mid-2007 because of the Part D implementation in 2006. We conduct numerous robustness checks to confirm that the reduction in cardiovascularrelated mortality is statistically significant. For example, weighting by population, including county-specific trends or county disease-specific trends, produces similar results. Furthermore, the estimates provide evidence of a delayed-mortality effect. Specifically, estimates using the dynamic model show that those counties that experienced larger declines in mortality because of the reform had larger rebounds in mortality the subsequent year.
We also find evidence that Part D caused a decline in cardiovascular mortality over and above its impact on the near elderly (i.e., ages 55 to 64) in the same county. Despite this evidence, we do not use the near elderly in our main analysis because they are not an appropriate control group. In particular, we find that Part D had a significant, albeit smaller, impact on the cardiovascular mortality rate of the near elderly. Indeed, around 17 percent of Medicare enrollees are below the age of 65 and are relatively unhealthy as they must be disabled, have end stage renal disease (ESRD), or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) to qualify for Medicare. We show that the reduction in mortality for the near elderly is concentrated in those counties with a higher share of Medicare individuals below 65. Importantly, our results imply that an analysis that uses the near elderly as a control group to measure the implied effects of Part D will understate the true effects of the reform.
To better understand the total value of the Part D expansion, we measure the effects of Part D on prescription drug expenditures using the MCBS data. As expected, those areas predicted to be most affected by the reform had the largest increase in drug expenditures. We find that the increase in spending occurs in 2006, corresponding with patterns found in other work. Overall, the reforms are associated with a 28 percent reduction in out-ofpocket cost sharing and a 10 percent increase in drug expenditures. Across several estimates, we find that the predicted changes in response to the reform imply a price elasticity of demand between −0.2 and −0.4, which corresponds roughly to other estimates in the literature (e.g., Newhouse 1993; Chandra et al. 2010) .
The growth in expenditures caused by the reform are compared with the monetized benefit of lives saved with the aim to better understand the overall value of the reform. Based on a $200,000 monetary value of a life year, 4 we find that the additional value of life years gained is between $1.5 and $4.8 billion, which greatly exceeds the additional out-ofpocket costs for cardiovascular-related drugs of $800 million. In fact, for most of our key specifications, the total benefit exceeds the total estimated additional spending on cardiovascular drugs from the program of $3.5 billion. When the financial risk protection of the program is also considered (see Engelhardt and Gruber 2011) it is likely that the benefits of the program greatly outweighed the deadweight loss of the reform across all scenarios. 5 This paper is related to two other recent studies that examine the effects of Medicare Part D on health. Huh and Reif (2017) analyzed the effects of Part D by using a regression discontinuity design for those individuals entering the Medicare population at age 65. They find statistically significant effects on reducing mortality for this subset of the Medicare population. Our analysis is complementary to this work, as we find a reduction in mortality for the broader 65+ Medicare population using an alternative identification strategy. We also provide evidence that Huf and Reif (2017) may be understating the effects on mortality because a disproportionate share of individuals in their control group, individuals just below 65, are enrolled in Medicare. Another related study is Kaestner, Long, and Alexander (2014) who apply a difference-in-differences analysis, but only focus on those individuals enrolled in traditional fee-for-service Medicare, excluding Medicare Advantage and dual-eligible enrollees. They find no significant effect on mortality. In contrast, our analysis focuses on local county variation in insurance coverage, including Medicare Advantage and dual-eligible enrollees, which we found to be important for identifying the effects of Part D on mortality.
Although this study solely assesses prescription drug expansion, it is related to a broader literature discussing the link between health insurance and health outcomes. A well-known RAND study, a randomized trial of health insurance coverage across the population (Newhouse 1993) , found that insurance generosity had only a limited impact on health. More recently, a randomized experiment in Oregon found no statistically significant relationship between Medicaid coverage and measured physical outcomes after two years (Baicker et al. 2013) . By contrast, Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009) apply regression discontinuity analysis and find lower mortality rates and higher service utilization for Medicare patients admitted to emergency departments, relative to individuals under age 65. 6 Our study shows that a subset of health insurance, specifically prescription drug coverage, has had clear positive effects on health outcomes, mainly stemming from the improved health for those with cardiovascular-related diseases.
The goal of this study is to measure the estimated lives saved by the Part D program. While the estimates show the effects of prescription drug insurance on the health of the population, it is important to keep in mind that this effect is identified on a particular local average treatment effect around the reform. Prior to the expansion, one may expect that those with the highest need for prescription drugs would have purchased insurance, and thus we expect the expansion effect found in this study to be less than randomized assignment of drug insurance. 5 Engelhardt and Gruber (2011) measure the value of financial risk protection from the Part D program and find that it roughly equals the deadweight loss of financing Part D. Their cost-benefit analysis did not consider the potential health benefits of the Part D program. 6 An examination of the introduction of Medicare in 1965 shows no effect of Medicare expansion on mortality (Finkelstein and McKnight 2008) .
The study is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of the Part D program, patterns on spending and mortality, and the efficacy of prescription drugs. Section III provides insight on delayed-mortality and competing-risk effects. Section IV reviews the data and discusses how we measured pre-and post-reform drug coverage. In Section V, we examine the timing of the effects of the reform in terms of out-of-pocket prices, utilization, and mortality. In Section VI we estimate a competing-risks model, and in Section VII we perform a type of cost-benefit analysis of the Part D reform using the estimates obtained in the study. In Section VIII we conclude.
II. Background on Medicare Part D and Drug Spending
Medicare was established in 1965 and provides insurance coverage to those age 65 and older, as well as to certain disabled populations. Although the program covered most medical-care expenditures, such as hospital and doctor office expenditures, it did not cover prescription drug costs. In 1965 this was not viewed as a serious omission because prescription drugs accounted for a small fraction of total expenditures. However, in subsequent years, numerous breakthroughs in the pharmaceutical sector led to innovative treatments that greatly increased expenditures on prescription drugs. Just before the 2006 reform, the total average per capita expenditures on prescription drugs for the 65+ population was $1,743 per year in 2004-05 (about 18 percent of total medical expenditures).
With the aim of reducing the burden of drug expenditures for the elderly, Congress passed the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which introduced Medicare Part D in January 2006 and led to a substantial expansion in prescription drug coverage. Unlike traditional fee-for-service Medicare that is administered by the federal government, Medicare Part D coverage is offered through private sector insurers that are under contract with the government. Individuals can obtain insurance through three distinct alternatives. One option is to purchase a stand-alone Medicare Prescription Drug Plan (PDP), which offers prescription drug benefits. Another option is to purchase a private Medicare Advantage plan, an alternative to traditional fee-for-service Medicare, which provides all the benefits associated with fee-for-service Medicare but often includes additional benefits, such as prescription drug coverage. The third option is to retain their existing drug coverage that they received through their current employer, as long as the plan's benefits are comparable to or better than to the standard Medicare PDP. be affected.
8 While there is a steady decline in the mortality rate for cardiovascular-related conditions, this decline is also observed prior to Part D implementation.
A likely contributing factor to the persistent decline in cardiovascular-related mortality is a continued rise in the use of cardiovascular drugs both before and after the reform.
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These cardiovascular drugs fall into three classes: antihyperlipidemic agents, antihypertensive drugs, and coagulation modifiers. These three therapeutic classes of drugs are particularly effective at treating cardiovascular illnesses and preventing cardiovascularrelated deaths.
The largest category is antihyperlipidemic agents, which is a category of drugs used to treat high cholesterol, one of the leading causes of heart disease. In numerous clinical trials, anticholesterol drugs have proven effective at reducing cardiovascular deaths (LaRosa, He, and Vupputuri 1999; Law, Wald, and Budnicka 2003) and this category of drugs underwent substantial expansion and innovation in the preceding decade (Dunn 2012) . The second category of cardiovascular agents includes a variety of antihypertensive drugs used to treat high blood pressure, such as oral diuretics, calcium channel blockers, beta-blockers, angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, and angiotension-receptor antagonists, all of which have been shown to substantially reduce the risk of mortality, stroke, and heart attacks (Cutler et al. 2007 ). The smallest of these three categories, based on expenditures, is the coagulation modifiers. Coagulation modifiers include a variety of drugs that are used to prevent clots from forming in blood vessels and to prevent strokes. Like other categories of drugs, these have also been proven highly effective in reducing cardiovascularrelated mortalities (Antithrombotic Trialists' Collaboration 2002). Combined, these three drug categories account for 48 percent of expenditures for individuals 65 and older over the 2003-09 period, and they account for an even greater share of pharmacy purchases, around 53 percent.
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Most of these types of cardiovascular drugs have been shown to have an immediate impact on an individual's health. The timing of the benefits of drugs used to treat hypertension is well documented. For instance, two well-known clinical trials performed in the 1960s by the Veterans Administration Cooperative Study Group (VACG 1967 , 1970 found strong evidence that hypertension drugs are effective within a small time frame.
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Drug treatment was shown to reduce the risk of death from 55 percent to 18 percent over a five-year period, with effects beginning in the first year of treatment.
8 About 1.8 million individuals over the age of 65 die each year, so it may be challenging to identify the thousands of individuals who lived due to Part D reform using national aggregate mortality statistics. 9 Cutler (2004) argues that roughly one-third of the decline in cardiovascular-related mortality may be attributable to innovative prescription drugs that control hypertension and high cholesterol. 10 Estimates were obtained from Medical Care Expenditure Panel Survey data. 11 One trial consisted of 143 male hypertensive patients with very high diastolic blood pressure, averaging between 115 and 129 mm Hg. Over the course of the trial period, there were no deaths in the treated group and four deaths in the placebo group. Three of these four deaths occurred within the first six months of the trial period. The second VACG trial examined hypertensive males with less severe diastolic blood pressurebetween 90 and 114 mm Hg.
More recent clinical trials of drugs used to treat hypertension have been conducted on older patients, as well as patients with isolated systolic hypertension. For instance, a trial by the SHEP Cooperative Research Group (SHEP 1991) examined the effect of a low-dosage of chlorthalidone on individuals over the age of 60. The trial found that the incidence of total stroke (i.e., fatal and nonfatal) was reduced by 36 percent over five years, with large effects within 18 months of treatment (see Figure 2 of the study on page 3259). Results from the Swedish Trial in Old Patients with Hypertension (Dahlof et al. 1991) , focused on older individuals (ages 70 to 84) with hypertension. The study found that drug treatment reduced the risk of death within one year of treatment.
Results from clinical trials on statins began being reported in the early 1990s. The Cholesterol Treatment Trialists' (CTT) Collaboration summed up many of these trials in a meta-analysis based on individual patient data. The study showed efficacy across a broad range of patients (CTT Collaboration 2005) . In particular, there was a large reduction in fatal coronary heart disease and nonfatal myocardial infarction in the first year of treatment. Certain studies show large immediate impacts on mortality for sicker individuals. For instance, a study by the Blood Pressure Lowering Treatment Trialists' Collaboration (BPLTT Collaboration 2003) examined the impact of atorvastatin on patients with lowerthan-average cholesterol, but who had hypertension. The study showed that the risk of fatal coronary heart disease or nonfatal myocardial infarction fell significantly in the first year of follow-up. A later meta-analysis by the CTT (CTT Collaboration 2008) showed similarly strong effects on mortality for patients with and without diabetes within one year of treatment.
12
The noncardiovascular expenditures are likely to have a relatively small impact on mortality. Cancers, which are the second leading cause of death for the over 65 age group, are often treated by chemotherapy drugs, which were covered by Part B prior to the reform. Most of the other expenditures on prescription drugs that are not for the treatment of cardiovascular-related conditions are for musculoskeletal conditions, digestive conditions, or mental health, which have less of an immediate impact on mortality.
We do not observe any sharp changes in aggregate-level mortality rates, despite the substantial evidence that Part D increased prescription drug utilization (i.e., Lichtenberg and Sun 2007; Ketcham and Simon 2008; Khan and Kaestner 2009; Duggan and ScottMorton 2010) . Therefore, to identify the effects of Part D on mortality, this paper exploits geographic differences in drug insurance coverage before the reform.
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12 More recent meta-analyses have shown that statins may reduce major cardiovascular events for patients without any cardiovascular disease (CTT Collaboration 2010 , 2012 . 13 As discussed in more detail later, prior to the reform, drug insurance coverage across geographic markets was influenced by several factors, such as the availability of Medicare Advantage plans, which frequently offered drug coverage. Drug coverage was also influenced by the eligibility requirements for Medicaid in the state, the prevalence of employers offering prescription drug coverage to retirees, and other socioeconomic factors. Those areas that had lower levels of drug coverage before the reform are also the areas that had higher levels of drug utilization expansion.
The timing of the reform's effect on utilization is also important for identification. The MCBS data set used to estimate drug coverage in this paper is not large enough to investigate the precise month that Part D had an effect on prescription drug utilization, because some purchases of Part D plans occurred later in 2006. However, two papers in the literature provide strong evidence of the timing of Part D's impact on utilization. Ketcham and Simon (2008) use a large database of pharmacy claims, covering about 31 percent of the nation's prescriptions and covering 80 percent of US counties, and find that most of the expansion in prescription drug utilization occurred quite rapidly in the first few months of 2006. Similar timing is observed by Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) using distinct pharmacy claims data from Walgreens. Although the MCBS data in our paper cannot be used to look at monthly changes, we are able to examine annual changes in prescription drug purchases. Consistent with these papers, we find drug expenditures increased significantly in 2006 in those counties most impacted by Part D. We also find that this higher level of spending persisted for years after the reform. Therefore, considering mid-2006 to mid-2007 as the initial 12 months that Part D would have an impact on mortality seems appropriate.
An alternative strategy for identifying the effects of reform on mortality is to see how mortality rates of individuals aged 65+ have changed relative to a younger but comparable population, the population aged 55-64. In fact, this is the strategy recently taken by Huh and Reif (2017) , who compare those just above age 65 to those just below 65. We also explore differential effects of Part D on this population in our analysis as additional proof of identification. However, an issue with this approach is that around 7 percent of the 55-64 population qualifies for Medicare based on their disabilities, but this insurance information is not available in the mortality data. This population is relatively unhealthy, accounting for around 18 percent of total medical expenditures for the 55-64 age category. The reported rate of cardiovascular conditions in this population is actually much more prevalent than in the 65-69 age range.
14 In fact, the annual mortality rate for the 55-64 age category enrolled in Medicare is about 3 percent, compared with less than 1 percent for the general population in that age range. In addition, Part D had a substantial impact on prescription drug coverage for the under 65 Medicare population, increasing the share of the under 65 Medicare enrollees with drug coverage from around 70 percent to 90 percent. Therefore, the introduction of Part D will likely have a disproportionate effect on the mortality of the Medicare subpopulation in the 55-64 age range, potentially leading to an underestimation of the total mortality effect. 15 We provide evidence that a comparison with the 55-64 population could substantially understate the effects of Part D, because of the Medicare-eligible population in this age range. 
III. Drug Insurance Coverage Expansion and Expected Effects on Mortality
Assessing the impact of drug insurance expansion on mortality includes a number of empirical challenges. To highlight these challenges and also help motivate our empirical approach, we begin by discussing the hypothetical effects of an insurance expansion on mortality rates. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical effect of drug insurance expansion on mortality. On the x-axis is a timeline, and the y-axis includes the two main mortality rates studied in this paper: cardiovascular-related mortality and noncardiovascular-related mortality. We normalize the mortality rate for both categories to 4 percent before the reform. The annual mortality rate is measured over a one-year period and represents the share of the population that dies in the following year, which is calculated based on a ratio of the number of deaths in the following year divided by the total population. For example, the mortality rate in period t captures the share of the population at time t − 1 that dies over the following year. The timeline includes the pre-Part D period when mortality rates are constant, as well as the point of drug insurance expansion at time period t − 1.
Panel a shows the impact on the mortality rate under the assumption that prescription drugs have a large beneficial health effect on cardiovascular-related illnesses. Here there is a permanent decline in the level of cardiovascular mortality rate, and no impact on the noncardiovascular mortality rate. Panel a, however, ignores the fact that those saved by the reform are likely in poor health status-that is, they are on the margin of dying. This poses two additional likely effects of the Medicare Part D health reform.
First, those individuals saved by the reform likely have numerous comorbidities. Once saved, these individuals are more likely to die of an alternative cause. In other words, different disease categories are competing risks. Second, those individuals saved by the reform likely have more severe forms of cardiovascular or noncardiovascular disease, and therefore represent a sicker population. Thus, the periods after the reform will appear to have a less healthy population, which increases the proportion of those dying from any disease. Similar types of "harvesting" effects have been documented by researchers studying the impact of weather and air quality on mortality (e.g., Lee 1981; Hajat et al. 2002; Schwartz 2001; Deschenes and Moretti 2009 ), but to our knowledge, this phenomenon has not been studied in the context of Medicare Part D.
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These two additional effects are included in panel b. The competing-risks effect causes the mortality rate for noncardiovascular deaths to increase-once being saved, the individual is more likely to die of something other then cardiovascular disease. 17 The delayedmortality effect causes both cardiovascular-and noncardiovascular-related mortality to increase in later periods. This reflects the fact that those (likely sicker) individuals saved from a cardiovascular-related death in period t enter the population of period t + 1, raising the mortality rate for any cause.
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The magnitude of these effects will depend on the health of the population that survives because of the reform. Interestingly, we should expect that the health of the population in the post-reform periods will be quite distinct from the population health in the pre-reform period, precisely when the effect on mortality is larger. Therefore, one might expect this secondary effect to be strongest in those areas where Part D has the greatest impact.
The parameters used in constructing Figure 1 were chosen for illustrative purposes, but the patterns in this figure offer several insights that will help guide the measurement of the effects on mortality. One lesson implied by Figure 1 is that identifying the timing of the effects of the reform is critical. Measuring the effects of reform on mortality in later periods may not accurately capture the effects of the reform. For example, the mortality rate several years after the reform might look similar to the mortality rate before the reform simply because the post-reform population includes sicker individuals previously saved by the reform. In other words, the delayed-mortality effect is caused by an unobserved change in the health of the population that is related to the reform, which may introduce a bias when measuring the effects of the reform in periods beyond the immediate post period. This bias is likely to be negatively correlated with the impact of Part D on the mortality rate. Therefore, in order to identify the effects of insurance expansion on mortality in later periods, it may be important to account for the changes in the health of the population caused by the reform. Another lesson learned from Figure 1 is that the changes in the disease-specific mortality rates may be more appropriate than looking at changes in total mortality if Part D had a differential effect on mortality for cardiovascular disease.
IV. Data
The data for this study are from two main sources. One data source is the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) from 2001 to 2009. The MCBS is an annual survey administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); the MCBS randomly surveys approximately 12,000 individuals from the full Medicare population each year. The second data source is the micro mortality data from the CDC.
The MCBS data contain demographic and medical-care information on individuals in the survey. The demographics include age, sex, education, income, self-reported health conditions, and perceived health status of the individuals. The survey also covers information about individual insurance enrollment. Although all individuals in the sample are covered by Medicare, the generosity of the drug insurance coverage may vary greatly. For instance, an individual could have a Medicaid plan, a Medicare Advantage plan, or a variety of supplemental insurance plans, such as Medigap or retiree drug coverage. Within each plan category, the level of generosity can also vary by a large amount and the available options often changed as a result of the introduction of Part D. For instance, after the introduction of Part D, those individuals who received their prescription drug coverage through Medicaid were automatically enrolled in Part D. The MCBS data also include expenditure information, including total expenditures for all services as well as out-of-pocket expenditures. Expenditure information is also provided by category, including prescription drug expenditures and out-of-pocket drug expenditures. Table 1 provides some basic descriptive statistics on the Medicare population age 65+ around the time of implementation from 2004 to 2007. The first point to note is that a substantial fraction of the 65+ Medicare population has cardiovascular-related conditions. Around 20 percent of the sample has a serious heart-related condition (including arteriosclerotic heart disease, heart attack, angina, or congestive heart failure) that likely puts them at a high risk of cardiovascular death. In addition, 49 percent report having hypertension and 22 percent have diabetes, which are key risk factors for developing more serious heart conditions. Another feature of this older demographic is that they tend to be afflicted by other serious health conditions. For example, around 9 percent of the population is reported to have some type of cancer. For this older population, these various conditions should be viewed as competing risks that often appear together. For instance, two-thirds of individuals reporting cancer also report having diabetes, hypertension, or some severe heart condition.
The bottom of Table 1 reports summary information on expenditures both before and after the reform. A particularly noticeable difference in the pre-and post-reform periods is the large change in the share of expenditures that is paid out of pocket, falling from 31.1 percent prior to the reform to 23.3 percent. Therefore, as expected, Part D appears to cause an increase in the generosity of drug benefits, but the share of spending for nonprescription drug services paid out of pocket barely changes.
We measure whether an individual has drug coverage using a combination of survey information from the individual that indicates drug insurance coverage and expenditure information. The MCBS includes information on whether individuals have drug insurance through Medicaid, Medicare Advantage (the private component of Medicare), or an Cancer and other heart-related condition 0.06 alternative supplementary drug plan. Benefit structures can vary widely across plans and may also change before and after implementation as the competitive landscape and offerings shift. For this reason, we refine our prescription drug insurance indicator by incorporating reported out-of-pocket and total prescription drug expenditure information into our definition of drug coverage to ensure that the expenditure information does not contradict the coverage variable from the survey.
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19 Specifically, for those individuals who have more than $100 in total drug expenditures, we indicate people as having drug insurance if they pay less than 20 percent of the total expenditures out of pocket, and we mark them as not having drug coverage if they pay more than 80 percent of expenditures out of pocket.
The MCBS data are used in two aspects of this paper. First, the MCBS data are used to estimate both the pre-reform drug insurance coverage across geographic areas, as well as the predicted change in the insurance rate after the reform. This is essential for identification of the mortality effect of the reform and will be discussed further in the following subsection. Second, the MCBS data are used to examine how the reform impacts prescription drug utilization and expenditures.
The second data source is mortality data from the CDC that include information (age, sex, cause of death, and county) on every death in the United States from 2000 to 2010. The cause of death is listed as a precise diagnosis that we aggregate to more broadly defined disease chapters. We classify "cardiovascular deaths" as all causes of death that fall under the chapter category called "diseases of the circulatory system" in the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9).
20 These causes of death include atherosclerosis, heart attacks, and various types of heart disease. The key therapeutic classes target the major conditions in this category. 21 We focus primarily on two cause-of-death categories: (1) cardiovascular-related deaths and (2) noncardiovascular-related deaths (i.e., all others). To construct mortality rate estimates for each county, the mortality data are combined with information about the population in each county taken from the intercessional estimates of the US Census Bureau, which is a population estimate for July 1 of each year. The annual mortality rate is computed by dividing the total deaths from July 1 to June 30 of the following year by the total population estimate for July 1 of the initial year.
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There are two measurements of mortality assessed in this paper. One measurement is a basic ratio of the number of deaths from period t to t + 1 divided by the population in period t. In these estimates, the mortality rates are constructed by sex and five-year age categories up to the age of 84. The census also reports total population for males and females age 85 and older, but there are no five-year age categories. Since age adjustment cannot be performed for those individuals 85 and over, we focus on the age 65 to 84 population. 23 Survey information indicating drug insurance status is used for those individuals who have less than $100 in drug expenditures and those individuals who pay less than 80 percent out of pocket, but more than 20 percent. We explore alternative drug coverage definitions, but they produce qualitatively similar results. 20 Specifically, the data provide cause of death by ICD-10 codes. Since ICD-9 codes have been more broadly used in the health literature, we use a disease-crosswalk to map these codes to broadly defined ICD-9 disease chapters (http://www.nber.org/data/icd9-icd-10-cm-and-pcs-crosswalk-general-equivalence -mapping.html). 21 We report the frequency by disease chapter in an Online Appendix (http://www.mitpressjournals.org /doi/suppl/10.1162/ajhe_a_00107), which shows that 40 percent of all deaths are from cardiovascular-related conditions. 22 We use CDC data rather than Medicare claims data to study the impact of Part D on mortality for two reasons. First, we are not aware of any available sample of claims for the full Medicare Advantage population. Second, even if claims data were available, it may be challenging to use this information to control for the health of the population, since the observation of diseases in the claims will be biased toward those who seek medical care. In contrast, the death certificates are more likely to be uniformly measured across populations and over time. 23 Results for the overall 65+ population (i.e., including those age 85 and above) are included in the Online Appendix.
An overall mortality rate is constructed by weighting the population in each age-sex bin based on the overall population in that category for the year 2000, so that mortality rates are comparable across counties and over time. 24 One issue with this mortality measure is that it treats the death of a 65-year-old person and an 84-year-old person equally, even though the total years-of-life-lost (YLL) are likely greater when a 65-year-old individual dies than when an 84-year-old individual dies. To better reflect the total YLL, we construct an alternative measure in which deaths are weighted by the expected years of life lost for each age category. 25 To reduce small-sample bias, we include only those counties with at least 2,000 individuals 65 and over, which implies about 30 to 40 cardiovascular deaths per year in the county.
Our analysis also incorporates annual unemployment data at the county level from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. While much of our analysis looks over a relatively short time period and uses county disease fixed effects that lessen the need for detailed controls for population health, the unemployment rate has been shown to be a key determinant of population mortality in several studies, starting with the seminal work of Ruhm (2000) . Given that unemployment rates can change quickly over short periods of time, this information is included in our analysis. Another more general trend noted in the literature is the relationship between socioeconomic status and mortality trends. Specifically, several papers have documented mortality rates falling more rapidly for populations with higher socioeconomic status, relative to populations with lower socioeconomic status (see Saez and Zucman 2016) . We use the median household income in the beginning of our sample in 2000 as a proxy for the socioeconomic status of the county and interact that income level with a year trend variable. For robustness checks, additional information about the population is taken from the Area Resource File (ARF) and health information from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).
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A. M E A S U R I N G T H E G E O G R A P H I C VA R I AT I O N O F T H E I M PA C T O F M E D I C A R E PA R T D
A challenge in this study is to characterize the population most affected by Medicare Part D. Intuitively, those individuals most affected by this expansion should be those with no drug coverage before the expansion. The institutional features of the insurance market indicate that geography was a major source of variation in drug coverage prior to the reform. In particular, two major sources of prescription drug coverage for those 65+ before the profitability in a particular area. Profitability depends on several factors, such as the potential number of covered lives in an area (i.e., scale) or the number of insurers offering commercial insurance (i.e., scope), and regulatory considerations (e.g., CMS payment rate). CMS pays Medicare Advantage plans for each beneficiary. These rates, set by the CMS, vary at the county level and are key determinants of insurer entry across markets. 27 In addition to these sources of geographic variation that are affected by government policy, the generosity of retiree benefits, including drug benefits, may vary across regions because of differences in labor market conditions and practices.
The differences in drug coverage across the United States reveal the importance of geography. The features of the Medicare drug insurance market prior to reform suggest that the effect of Part D should be measured at the county level, to reflect local socioeconomic factors and insurance market offerings. Another important reason for focusing on drug insurance coverage at the county level is the sample design of the MCBS survey, where the sampling units consist of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and groups of rural counties. In fact, many states are not even sampled, and within states that are sampled only part of the state is included. For example, the sample is drawn from the Seattle area of Washington State, but not eastern Washington.
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Based on the sample design of the MCBS and the local determinants of drug coverage, our analysis focuses on areas where the MCBS sample is concentrated. To capture the variation in prescription drug offerings at the county level, and maximize the accuracy of the county-level estimates, we examine two samples: a "core" sample of counties and an "expanded" sample, which includes the core sample. The core sample includes those counties in the MCBS where we have sufficient observations in the MCBS to infer the level of prescription drug coverage before Part D was implemented. To expand the number of counties, we make predictions of the county-level pre-reform prescription coverage using characteristics of those counties where the MCBS data are present. a.1. core sample. To construct an age-sex-adjusted level of prescription drug coverage, we run a probit model on the set of individuals in the MCBS prior to the reform. Specifically, we run the following probit on sample years 2004 and 2005 in the MCBS data:
, 27 Regulatory restrictions require that when private insurers enter at the county level. Although Medicare Advantage plans were not required to offer drug benefits before the reform, greater competition in the Medicare Advantage market has been associated with improved generosity of benefits, including drug benefits (Dunn 2011 where γ c are county-specific fixed effects and X is a vector of covariates representing the individual i's age and sex as well as a year dummy. 29 The dependent variable represents an indicator whether individual i has drug coverage. represents the normal distribution CDF.
We use the population weights from the MCBS to derive the predicted pre-reform insurance rate in each county. Specifically, we calculate SHARE a.2. expanded sample. The MCBS sample spans a large area of the country and includes a diverse set of rural and urban counties. Our strategy for expanding the countylevel sample is guided by where in the country the MCBS is conducted. Given the lack of the MCBS data in many large geographic areas (e.g., Oregon, Idaho, and North Dakota) we do not attempt to expand the sample across all counties in the United States Instead, we focus on predictions in the immediate geographic areas where the MCBS sample is concentrated, typically around combined statistical areas (CSAs).
We estimate a regression model to make predictions of drug coverage rates by county based on the SHARE pre c measures constructed as described above. In particular, we regress SHARE pre c on 2005 county-level population characteristics from the ARF, and use the estimated parameters to predict drug coverage rates for certain counties outside of the core sample. The explanatory variables include the share Medicaid in the county, Medicare Advantage penetration, income, population density, population size, share veteran, share white, and the share of the population 65+ below the poverty level. Importantly, we include region dummies in the regression to capture unobservable local factors that affect prescription drug insurance coverage.
32 As expected, the estimates (reported in an Online 29 In our main estimates we include only age and sex information in X, since they are reflected and controlled for in our mortality estimates. Results of this probit estimation are reported in the Online Appendix. For robustness, we ran alternative estimates to calculate the share of covered individuals (e.g., including additional controls in the vector X) and obtained similar results. 30 This is also based on the threshold that the age 65+ county population was greater than 2,000 individuals in the year 2000. 31 The variation in the drug coverage for this core sample is shown graphically in the Online Appendix, which shows large variation in pre-reform coverage, even across counties within the same state. For instance, for the 12 counties in Florida the SHARE pre c variable ranges from 60 to 87 percent. 32 A region was defined as a CSA. For those counties not in a CSA, a region was defined as the MSA. For those counties not in a CSA or MSA, the region was defined as the state. Regions without multiple counties were not included in the regression. Appendix) show that both Medicaid and Medicare Advantage programs are important factors that determined drug coverage prior to Part D. In addition, the share of the population that is a veteran is another strong and positive predictor of coverage, likely from veteran health benefits that cover prescription drugs. 33 Finally, we find that the share of the 65+ population below poverty is a strong predictor of lower coverage. The R 2 is relatively high, 0.74, implying the regression is capturing a large degree of the variation in drug coverage rates across the country. These same steps are taken in an analogous fashion to predict the level of coverage after the reform, SHARE post c . We use the estimates from our county-level regression of SHARE pre c on covariates, to make predictions about the level of coverage for counties outside of the core sample. Specifically, the additional counties included in the expanded sample are those located in areas where we have a reasonable estimate of the regional dummy variable. Our specific criterion is that the region includes 30 or more observations within a selected CSA or MSA area. 34 The expanded sample includes an extra 361 counties, increasing the total sample size to 530 counties. The core sample counties include about 38 percent of the 65+ population in 2005, while the expanded sample includes 56 percent. Although the sample is not 100 percent, these areas were selected by the MCBS for constructing a nationally representative sample of the Medicare population.
The basis of our identification strategy is to identify geographic areas most impacted by the reform and those least impacted. Our prior assumption is that those areas with lower levels of coverage, pre-Part D, will be most impacted by implementation of Part D. To test this assumption, we study the relationship between the share of coverage prior to the reform and the increase in insurance coverage after the reform. In particular, we examine the correlation between the pre-reform level of drug coverage, SHARE was constructed in an analogous way as SHARE pre c . 36 A scatterplot of this relationship is available in the Online Appendix. For the Medicare Part D population, the share of individuals without drug insurance is a strong predictor of the change in the share of those insured, but is not equal to the actual change.
While our analysis exploits geographic differences in drug coverage, demographic factors may also affect levels of coverage before and after the reform. Specifically, individuals are less likely to have drug coverage as they get older, and this difference is especially large for individuals over the age of 85. There are several reasons that this paper does not focus on demographic variation in insurance coverage. First, the geographic variation appears to offer considerably more variation, relative to the demographic factors. This may be observed in the Online Appendix, which shows differences in pre-and post-reform drug coverage by age and sex. Second, much of the demographic variation in prescription drug coverage occurs because of the V. Timing of the Impact of Medicare Part D
In this section, we examine how Part D impacted the out-of-pocket price of prescription drugs and the timing of those effects. We also assess whether the timing corresponds with changes in the utilization of prescription drug purchases. Next, we analyze the timing of the effects of Part D on mortality.
A. T I M I N G O F PA R T D O N P R E S C R I P T I O N D R U G P U R C H A S E S A N D O U T -O F -P O C K E T P R I C E S
The most direct effect of the introduction of Part D on health-care markets should be its impact on out-of-pocket prices and utilization. Although the correlation between INS c on SHARE pre c demonstrates that those areas with less drug coverage pre-reform (years 2004-05) see the greatest increase in coverage post-reform (i.e., 2006-07), it does not show how prescription drug use or the out-of-pocket prices paid by consumers in those counties changed over the reform period. In this section, we show that the timing of the impact of Part D on out-of-pocket prices and utilization may be observed by looking at the change in these key variables in those markets most impacted by Part D, as measured by the share of the population without drug coverage pre-reform, (1 − SHARE pre c ).
To demonstrate the timing of the effect, we apply a difference-in-differences (DD) model to show how outcome variables in the MCBS data change in those counties most impacted by Part D. To do this, the outcome variable will be estimated as a function, f , of county fixed effects (γ c ), time fixed effects (γ t ), and individual-specific controls (Z i,t,c ), 
The coefficients τ t will indicate changes in the outcome variable for those counties most impacted by Part D. Note that the specific treatment variable is (1 − SHARE pre c ), which is the share of individuals without coverage prior to Part D implementation. We use the share without coverage as the treatment variable since it is positively correlated with the predicted change in insurance, making interpretation of our results more straightforward.
To investigate price effects, we estimate equation 2 with two different measures of the out-of-pocket price as left-hand-side outcome variables. One measure of the out-of-pocket price is the out-of-pocket expenditure share of individual i (i.e.,
out-of-pocket drug spend i,t,c total drug spend i,t,c
); the second measure of price is the log of the average out-of-pocket cost per prescription 85+ population, which is problematic because there is limited information available regarding the age distribution of this population by county. Finally, focusing on geographic variation in coverage simplifies the analysis. 37 The explanatory controls include age, sex, income, perceived health status, 26 medical condition categorical variables, race, and BMI. We also include county-level controls, X c,t , which include the unemployment rate and income trends (i.e., median income in the county in 2000 multiplied by a time trend). Similar results are obtained with a more limited set of controls. Those counties most impacted by Part D had relatively stable out-of-pocket prices prior to the reform. In addition, those counties have persistently lower levels of out-of-pocket prices post-reform, relative to pre-reform levels.
Next, we show that those counties most impacted by the reform experienced larger than average increases in utilization. To do this, we use two outcome measures of 38 For the out-of-pocket expenditure share, the linear model is out-of-pocket drug spend i,t,c total drug spend i,t,c
39 The figure using the core sample is almost identical and shown in the Online Appendix. utilization, total drug spending per individual and the number of prescriptions filled per individual. 40 To account for the skewness of the data, we estimate a generalized linear model (GLM) with a log link using the expanded sample (panels c and d, Figure 2) . 41 Corresponding to the drop in out-of-pocket price, we see a sharp and significant growth in utilization. Those counties most impacted by the reform experienced a level increase in utilization. Similar to the change in the out-of-pocket price, there does not appear to be any pre-trend effect in these counties.
Additional and closely related analysis is conducted to obtain a precise effect of the reform on expenditures and out-of-pocket price by scaling these estimates to the entire Medicare population. We use this analysis later in the paper to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the reform. 42 To summarize, we estimate that the average out-of-pocket share falls from 43 percent if no reform occurs, compared with around 31 percent with the reform. We find that the expenditure increases by about 10 percent with the reform, relative to the predicted expenditure level with no reform. Together, based on the estimates of the predicted expenditure change and out-of-pocket share change, we find an arc price elasticity of demand of −0.29. Using the number of prescriptions as the utilization variable, we find a 7 percent increase in prescriptions filled and an implied arc price elasticity of −0.25.
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B. T I M I N G O F PA R T D O N M O R TA L I T Y
To assess the timing of Part D drug insurance expansion on mortality, we apply a similar DD regression model. Again, we are measuring the impact of Part D on post-reform mortality using the prescription coverage share, SHARE pre c , as a treatment variable. The mortality regression takes the following form: The main parameter to be estimated in this model is τ d,t , which captures the effect of the reform on the mortality rate in year t, relative to the omitted year, which 40 To the extent that those with insurance pay a lower price than those without, the expenditure effect will include those price differences, so the expenditure change will understate the full quantity response (see Duggan and Scott-Morton 2010) . However, to address the potential issue of changing prices, we also analyze the count of the number of prescriptions purchased and find similar effects. 41 The GLM model is estimated with a gamma family distribution. The following is the functional form:
The term v i,t,c represents a random error term. Estimates using the core sample are almost identical and shown in the Online Appendix. 42 See the Online Appendix for details. 43 In the Online Appendix we estimate demand directly by using (1 − SHARE pre c ) as an instrument for the out-of-pocket price, and we obtain similar elasticity estimates of around −0.2 to −0.4. These price elasticity estimates are comparable to those found in the health literature (see Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010) and the RAND study, Newhouse (1993) , and the year disease fixed effects are, γ d,t . We assess two disease types: d = {cardiovascular, noncardiovascular} where all deaths fall into one of these two categories. The county disease-specific dummies are critical because they capture aspects of the population's health in a particular county that are constant both pre-and post-reform. The time dummies are disease specific and account for factors affecting mortality that are the same across all counties, such as common technological progress. The disease categories in this model are viewed as independent, and estimates for each may be computed using two separate regressions: one regression where the dependent variable is the cardiovascular mortality rate and a second regression where the dependent variable is the noncardiovascular mortality rate. The vector X c,t includes county-level controls. 44 The estimates of this model for both the core and the expanded sample are reported in Figure 3 , where each year on the x-axis represents the mortality rate from This implies a decline in mortality of 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points (or about a 12 percent decline in the mortality rate) for a county that goes from no drug coverage to full drug coverage.
In line with the simulation in Figure 1 , we observe an increase in both cardiovascular and noncardiovascular mortality in periods beyond the immediate post-reform period. While the effects on cardiovascular mortality show no pre-trend patterns, this is less clear for noncardiovascular mortality. In particular, the counties most impacted by Part D experienced lower mortality rates for noncardiovascular conditions early in the period (i.e., 2000 and 2001), compared with the period immediately before the reform (i.e., 2003 and 2004) . Several additional analyses were conducted to explore the robustness of 44 This includes a county-specific income trend (i.e., the median income of the county in the year 2000 multiplied by a year trend) and the county-level unemployment rate. Numerous studies have shown that income is an important determinant of the mortality rate (e.g., Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006; Saez and Zucman 2016) . Ruhm (2000) shows that the business cycle may be in an important determinant of mortality. The income trend captures long-run socioeconomic trends, while the unemployment rate captures short-run changes in health. these patterns by attempting to control for pre-trend effects. For one exercise, we include numerous additional control variables that may be related to mortality trends. 46 These additional controls have no effect on the cardiovascular pattern; however, they do mitigate the upward trend observed in the noncardiovascular category. 47 As a more conservative approach, we included county disease-specific trends in the analysis. We found similar declines in the cardiovascular mortality rate. For noncardiovascular conditions, all trends 46 These variables include the share of county under the poverty rate, education levels, smoking rates, obesity rates, and physical activity interacted with time trends. 47 We still observe a post-2006 rise in mortality for noncardiovascular conditions, although it is not significantly different from the 2004 mortality rate. One potential reason that controlling for trends may matter may be related to smoking. Those counties most affected by Part D have higher rates of smoking and the decline in smoking has been lower for those counties, relative to others. appear to be eliminated with the coefficient τ noncardio,t not rising above zero (see the Online Appendix).
These graphs provide information about the time series patterns of the effect of Part D on mortality, which supports the main patterns outlined in Figure 1 . As suggested in Figure  1 , we see the immediate decline in cardiovascular mortality for those counties most impacted by the reform. This mortality decline is followed by, what appears to be, a delayedmortality effect that shows an upward rise in mortality in those same counties. Recall that if this upward rise is due to a delayed-mortality effect, then estimates of τ d,t in later periods may be inappropriate for measuring the causal effect of the reform on mortality. This is because counties most affected by Part D are likely to have sicker populations in periods beyond the immediate post period, creating a positive bias on τ d,t in future periods. More explicit evidence of this delayed-mortality effect is presented in Section VI.
b.1. triple-difference specification and the impact of part d on the near elderly. The plots in Figure 3 offer strong evidence that Part D led to a sharp reduction in cardiovascular-related deaths in the elderly population. However, these patterns may be caused by unobserved factors that happen to affect those counties where Part D expansion had the greatest effect. To address this concern, we implement an additional exercise using the population ages 55-64 (the "near elderly") as an additional control group. In this subsection, we discuss the results of this type of "triple-difference" (DDD) exercise, which computes the relative effect of Part D on the elderly relative to the near elderly. We show that a DDD estimate will result in an understatement of the effects of Part D because the near elderly were also impacted by Part D. This is not entirely surprising given that approximately 17 percent of Medicare enrollees are below the age of 65 and are in relatively poor health since one must be disabled, have ESRD, or have ALS to qualify for Medicare.
To undertake this exercise, we append mortality data for the near elderly to our original data and run the following DDD regression:
where M g,d,t,c is the mortality rate of the elderly (g = ages 65 to 84) or the near elderly (g = ages 55 to 64), and D Age≥65 is a dummy variable equal to one if the dependent variable is the mortality rate for elderly and equal to zero if the dependent variable is the mortality rate for the near elderly. The coefficients α d,t quantify the relative effect of pre-Part D drug insurance coverage on the elderly mortality rate relative to the near-elderly mortality rate in year t relative to 2004. As above, we run this regression twice: once where the dependent variable is the cardiovascular mortality rate and another regression where the dependent variable is the noncardiovascular mortality rate. To distinguish between this model and the previous model, we refer to the estimates taken from equation 4 as the DDD estimates and the estimates taken from equation 3 as DD estimates. We report estimates of α d,t from the DDD estimation in panels a and b of Figure  4 . Generally, the DDD estimates show a similar pattern to those in Figure 3 ; however, there are some differences. For instance, the impact on noncardiovascular mortality shows no pre-reform upward trend, providing some evidence of a competing-risk and delayedmortality effect in the subsequent reform periods. Cardiovascular mortality shows a very similar pattern to the DD estimates; however, the magnitude of the decline is smaller.
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The DDD decline (panel a of Figure 4) is about 60 percent of the size of the DD decline (panel c of Figure 3) .
The lower magnitude in the DDD estimates is attributable to the fact that Part D also affected the mortality rate of the near elderly, which can be explained by describing the results in panels c through f of Figure 4 . Panel c of Figure 4 shows estimates of τ d,t running the DD specification 3 using the near-elderly mortality rate as the dependent variable. The pattern of the coefficients of τ show a clear impact of the reform on the near-elderly population, as τ falls to −0.0009 in 2006-about 40 percent of the size of the effect on the elderly population. To be sure this was attributable to the reform, we repeated this exercise a few times. First, we used the near-elderly noncardiovascular mortality rate as the dependent variable in the DD specification, which shows no such effect for noncardiovascular mortality (panel d). Next, we divided the sample into two mutually exclusive categories and ran the DD specification using the near-elderly cardiovascular mortality as the dependent variable. The first subsample (panel e) includes counties where the share of Medicare enrollees in 2005 who are non-elderly is in the upper tercile, and the second subsample (panel f) includes those counties where the share is in the lower tercile (panel f). 49 The results imply a relatively large effect of Part D on the near-elderly cardiovascular mortality rate in counties with a high share of nonelderly Medicare enrollees; but no discernable effect in those counties with a low share. That is, the effect of Part D on the near-elderly cardiovascular rate is stemming entirely from those counties with a high proportion of Medicare enrollees under the age of 65-exactly in those counties we would expect. Overall, this exercise demonstrates that caution should be used when quantifying the effects of Part D off of the relative difference between the elderly and near elderly. In other words, the near elderly are not an ideal control group to assess the impact of the reform and will result in estimates that understate the actual effects of the reform. This finding suggests that the study by Huh and Reif (2017) , which finds mortality effects for Medicare Part D by comparing the populations below and above age 65, may be understating the effects of Part D on the 65-year-old population studied in their paper.
The analysis in this section highlights some of the challenges of measuring the effects of Part D on mortality. First, identification over the entire post-reform period is problematic because Figure 3 highlights that there may be delayed-mortality effects in later periods. County fixed effects, aimed at controlling for the health of the population, will not capture delayed-mortality effects (discussed in Figure 1 is possible that a decline in mortality of one type may be related to an increase in mortality from other causes. This pattern suggests that a model that explicitly addresses these alternatives in a single competing-risks framework may be useful. Finally, using the nearelderly population as a control group is problematic because this group is also affected by Part D, albeit to a smaller degree than the elderly population.
VI. Competing-Risks Model
Next, we use a competing-risks model that allows alternative causes of death to be interrelated. This model recognizes that an increase in mortality from cancer necessarily implies a reduction in cardiovascular-related deaths. We assume three different health states: (1) cardiovascular death; (2) noncardiovascular death; and (3) alive. First, we introduce the baseline model. We then incorporate dynamic effects into the model that control for delayed-mortality effects (i.e., the impact of the reform on population health in subsequent periods).
A. B A S E L I N E M O D E L
Given that the goal is to quantify the entire post-period effect of the reform, we include a post-period dummy in place of the flexible time dummies used above. The health state of an individual, i, h d,t,c,i , takes the following functional form:
where the additional variable contained in equation 5, d,t,c,i , includes random factors that determine an individual's cause of death that is not shared by the entire county in time period t. We normalize the health state of being alive to zero. Therefore, the higher the value of the health state variable for cardiovascular-related and noncardiovascular-related conditions, the greater the probability that an individual dies of those respective causes. The main difference under equation 5, relative to the previous model, is that all three options are explicitly viewed as substitutes. For example, if h noncardio,t,c,i > h cardio,t,c,i > 0, then a person will die of a noncardiovascular cause, rather than a cardiovascular condition. To provide some structure on the substitution patterns among states, we assume that d,t,c,i is independently and identically distributed as type 1 extreme value. Also, let the average health of the population in the county for disease d be denoted
The usual logit functional form for the shares of individuals dying of disease d in period t is then
. Berry (1994) shows that the above model may be estimated with the following linear regression:
The model implicitly incorporates the substitution among conditions, where the logit functional form assumes that individuals substitute in proportion to the shares of each health state. One advantage of this approach is it accounts for all health states when measuring the impact on total mortality and also allows for a clear relationship across alternative causes of death. Another advantage is that it allows us to include county diseasespecific controls (e.g., county disease fixed effects), while still allowing us to compute an effect on total mortality.
There are two types of mortality rates studied in the competing-risks model. The simple mortality share, s d,t,c , considers the share of the population that falls into each of the three health states in each time period. The YLL mortality share, s Y LL d,t,c , considers the total potential life years in each state at the end of each period. 50 Essentially, this approach weights the population in each age group by the expected years of life for the average individual in the age group.
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B. I N C O R P O R AT I N G D Y N A M I C E F F E C T S
Measuring the effects of Part D in future periods must also account for the impact of the reform on population health in subsequent periods. Specifically, as argued in Figure 1 , the cardiovascular health of the population in previous periods may influence the health and the mortality rate of the population in subsequent periods. 52 We address this issue by explicitly controlling for dynamic mortality effects in the model. Importantly, the lag of the dependent variable contains information regarding the changing health of the population. If a relatively small fraction of individuals die from cardiovascular-related diseases in a previous period, relative to the average amount for that county, this likely implies a relatively large stock of individuals in the population who may die from this illness later. The lag of the dependent variable may be incorporated into the empirical model to capture changes in the health of the population, including information both related and unrelated to the reform. Let the lag of the dependent variable be δ d,t−1,c 51 Rather than normalize each county to the 2000 population, this analysis controls for the demographics by including the share of the population in each age-sex category interacted with each condition category as independent variables. 52 For example, suppose the reform acts to increase the life expectancy for those with an illness by about one year. In this case, those areas where the reform has a large impact will receive a large reduction in mortality in the amount of τ d (1 − SHARE these dynamic considerations is the following: 53 This second expression is crucial, since it is likely that many individuals changed treatment as a result of the reform, resulting in a change in survival in subsequent periods in proportion to those affected by the Part D introduction. In addition to being an important control, this variable also offers a test for the presence of the delayed-mortality effect. A negative coefficient of κ d,2 would imply that those counties most impacted by the reform (i.e., a larger decrease in mortality due to the reform) would have a larger increase in mortality in the subsequent period. 
C. C O M P E T I N G -R I S K S M O D E L R E S U LT S
In this section, we report results using both the baseline competing-risks model 6 and the competing-risks model incorporating dynamic effects 7. We report two sets of results. Columns 1 through 6 of Table 2 report results of the logit model estimated on 2000 to 2006 data 54 using either the core (columns 1, 3, 5) or expanded (columns 2, 4, 6) samples. For robustness purposes we include results based on regressions that include county trends (columns 3 and 4) and county disease trends (columns 5 and 6), as well as results using population weights (panels b and c). Panels a and b show results using mortality shares as The results from all regressions in Table 2 show a drop in cardiovascular-related deaths in the immediate post period. The effect on noncardiovascular deaths is small and statistically insignificant. The estimates from panel a, column 4, for example, imply that a county with a 1 percentage point increase in the share of individuals without drug insurance prior to the reform leads to an average 0.003 percent increase in lives saved from the reform. That is, for a population of 100,000 individuals, three additional lives would be saved, on average. From all regressions, we find that mortality rates for cardiovascular-related conditions significantly decline as does overall mortality, tested by applying a Wald test of the joint significance of τ cardio + τ noncardio . Table 3 reports results based on the full sample from 2001 to 2009 with mortality shares as the dependent variable.
56 Excluding the lagged terms (columns 1 and 2), there is no effect of Part D on cardiovascular-related deaths, and the results show a significant increase in noncardiovascular-related deaths. The models in columns 3 and 4 include the lagged dependent variable terms. The change in the results is striking, with the effect of Part D having a negative and statistically significant effect on cardiovascular mortality after the reform, while the effect on noncardiovascular mortality becomes insignificant.
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable interacted with the Part D change, κ d,2 , shows that for those counties most impacted by the reform, a larger decline in mortality in those counties had a larger increase in the mortality rate in the following period. That is, this term provides evidence of delayed-mortality effects.
One issue with applying equation 7 is that it incorporates both fixed effects and lagged dependent variables in the model. When the number of time periods is small, this estimation strategy potentially leads to inconsistent estimates (see Nickell 1981) . The concern arises because the change in the lagged dependent variable is necessarily related to the change in the error term, ξ d,t,c . However, we tested the model for serial correlation in the error term using the Wooldridge test (Drukker 2003) and found strong evidence that this was not impacting our results.
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The results of Table 3 indicate that the mortality effects of Part D continue through our entire sample and confirm the intuition described in Figure 1 . Specifically, once the change in the health of the population after the reform is accounted for, through κ d,2 , the effects on mortality hold throughout the entire sample. While this result supports the previous results, as with all studies of policy effects, there are more factors that could explain the effects as one moves farther away from the event, leading to less precise estimates.
D. R O B U S T N E S S A N A LY S I S
Several additional specifications have been estimated to explore the robustness of the results. Many of these robustness checks have been noted throughout the text and in 56 See the Online Appendix for results using years-of-life-lost shares as the dependent variable, as well as results using population weights. 57 Specifically, the p-value on the F-statistic testing the null hypothesis of no serial correlation on equation 6 under the 2000 to 2009 sample was 0.80. We also performed a robustness exercise in which we removed the county disease fixed effects and included the year 2000 value of the dependent variable as a control. No results changed. footnotes. This section highlights these robustness checks, which may be found in the Online Appendix. The baseline competing-risks model suffers from the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" problem that is caused by assuming that individuals substitute among alternatives in proportion to the share of each health state. We allow for more flexible substitution patterns by applying a nested-logit model. Consistent with results in the text, the nestedlogit model shows significant declines in cardiovascular mortality.
TA B L E
Our results are robust to a variety of alternative measures of pre-reform insurance coverage, SHARE pre c . Such measures include using raw data from the MCBS without demographic controls, using an alternative time period from the MCBS (2000 to 2003) , or including additional individual demographic controls from the MCBS (e.g., education, race, and health factors). We also apply an additional robustness check where we allow for additional flexibility in the population affected by Part D. In particular, in addition to allowing SHARE pre c to vary across counties, we also allow unique predictions of share to vary by sex and age (i.e., above or below 75) across regions. For instance, the pre-reform insurance coverage for males under 75 may be differentially affected in the same county. Similarly, we divide the mortality data into these same groups by county, sex, and age. This ultimately splits each of our observations into four separate observations (e.g., cardiovascular mortality rate for (1) male, under 75; (2) female, under 75; (3) male, over 75; (4) female, over 75). While this specification allows for additional flexibility in the effects of Part D, the results remain similar to the other specifications because pre-reform insurance coverage varied little across these different age-sex categories.
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VII. Measuring the Value of Medicare Part D Expansion
As a final exercise, we incorporate the results on expenditures with the results on mortality to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the reform. We focus on the lives saved in 2007. 59 The results are presented in Table 4 , which are scaled to the overall impact on the 65+ Medicare population.
The top half of Table 4 reports estimates of the reform's effect related to expenditures. The MCBS population weights are applied to arrive at a total expenditure estimate on prescription drugs for 2007 of around $79 billion. The estimated impact of the reform on expenditures, based on estimates similar to specification 2, is 10 percent, which amounts to an expenditure increase caused by the reform of $7.9 billion. A back-of-the-envelope calculation is conducted to arrive at expenditure figures for cardiovascular-related conditions. Since about 48 percent of total drug expenditures are on cardiovascular-related drugs, we estimate that the share of additional spending on cardiovascular-related drugs is $3.8 billion (i.e., $7.9 × 48 percent). Second, to arrive at a figure of out-of-pocket expenditures for prescription drugs, we use the average share of out-of-pocket post-reform spending of 23 percent, to arrive at the total increase in out-of-pocket spending on cardiovascular drugs of $800 million. 58 We also perform a number of other robustness tests available in an Online Appendix. Specifically, we include results using the full 65+ population, rather than 65 to 84. We include the period July 2005 to June 2006 as a pre-reform period, which we view as partially impacted by the reform. We include the dynamic results from Table 3 , but using the years-of-life-lost mortality calculation. We include the dynamic results from Table 3 , but weight for the county population size. The results from all of these robustness checks are similar to those presented in the text. 59 We focus on the cost and benefits of Part D for the first year of the reform because the pre-and postreform populations are most comparable and this allows us to avoid the delayed-mortality effects that may complicate the long-term analysis. More generally, as we move farther away from a reform, we will lose precision in measuring the direct effects of the reform. We report a range of estimated lives saved based on our preferred estimates, including both static and dynamic estimates. Our preferred estimates satisfy several key criteria. First, we use estimates that use a simple mortality rate, rather than years of life lost, as it is easier to translate the estimates into lives saved in 2007.
TA B L E 4 .
62 Also, we selected unweighted specifications in order to maximize the geographic diversity of the counties contributing to the estimates and to ensure that populous urban areas do not dominate the results. Finally, we believe that accounting for dynamics or county-specific trends is important. For this reason, all the static specifications that we include in this section incorporate a county-specific trend variable.
We report the effects on mortality using a variety of estimates that satisfy the key criteria discussed above. 63 These estimates are reported at the bottom of Table 4 . Our estimates show a decline in the mortality rate of between 0.7 and 2.4 percent. The results from these key estimates are comparable to those of Huh and Reif (2017) , who found a decline in the mortality rate of around 2 percent. The number of lives saved ranges from 7,000 to 26,000. In dollar terms this amounts to between $1.5 and $4.8 billion in the value of lives saved. The estimated value of lives saved exceeds the out-of-pocket expenditures of individuals on cardiovascular drugs, which is consistent with individuals purchasing prescription drugs whose benefit exceeds the out-of-pocket costs. The value of the additional drugs purchased for our preferred specifications ($1.5 to $4.8 billion) lies in the range of the total cost of the drugs ($3.5 billion). In fact, based on four out of five of these estimates, the 60 This is the amount applied in Eggleston et al. (2011) . 61 This is computed in an analogous manner to how we compute the counterfactual expenditures. To obtain the mortality rate without the reform, we subtract the term τ d · INSc α1 from the expected mortality rate, where τ d is the coefficient on (1 − SHARE pre c ) in the mortality rate regression, INS c is the expected change in insurance from the reform obtained from the linear regression INS c = α 0 + α 1 (1 − SHARE pre c ), and α 1 is the coefficient in this regression. 62 However, estimates from both approaches imply a similar number of lives saved. 63 While we view some specification features as preferable to others, there are many cases where the tradeoffs across specifications are less certain. For instance, there is a trade-off between using the core and expanded samples. The expanded sample is able to include a much larger number of counties, potentially increasing precision and the representativeness of the estimates. On the other hand, the core sample has the desirable feature of using individual observations in each county to measure the likely impact of Part D and does not rely on predictions. For this reason, we present estimates using both the core and the expanded samples. Another case where the trade-off is unclear is between using county-specific trends or county disease-specific trends. The county disease-specific trends are able to account for disease-specific trends in each county but also greatly reduce the degrees of freedom. We present a third estimate that includes county disease-specific trends. Finally, in addition to these trade-offs, it is unclear whether a static or dynamic specification is preferred. The dynamic specification estimates the effects of the reform over the entire sample but includes periods that are more distant from the reform. The dynamic specification is also more reliant on the functional form. benefit generated from lives saved is equal to or above the total additional expenditures on cardiovascular drugs.
The analysis here does not consider the welfare benefits of reducing the financial risk of the population. Engelhardt and Gruber (2011) examine this issue and find that the welfare benefits of financial protection are about $455 per beneficiary, on average, or $15.7 billion in total. 64 This amount is slightly larger than the deadweight loss that they estimate of $430 per recipient, or $14.8 billion. Incorporating the health benefits of cardiovascular treatments into the calculation adds between $43 and $140 in welfare gains per Medicare beneficiary, suggesting an overall welfare gain from Part D's introduction of between $68 and $165 per beneficiary or between $2.3 and $5.7 billion per year.
65
VIII. Conclusion
This study provides evidence of the impact of the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance expansion on mortality for the 65+ population. Applying a difference-in-differences framework that exploits the geographic differences in drug coverage across markets prior to reform, we find a statistically significant reduction in cardiovascular-related deaths, saving between 7,000 and 26,000 lives in its first year. While the exact magnitude of the number of lives saved depends on the particular specification, the basic result of a decline in cardiovascular-related deaths is shown to hold up across a variety of robustness tests.
We find three features of the analysis that are critical for identifying the effects from the Part D program. First, we recognize that the Part D reform may transform the health of the population in future periods. Consequently, much of our analysis focuses on the impact of the reform immediately after implementation. Second, we study the impact of mortality on the condition that is most likely to be impacted by the reform, cardiovascular-related conditions. Third, we find that Part D had a small but statistically significant effect on the population under 65. Thus, researchers should be aware that the population under 65 may not be a proper control group when studying the impact of the Part D reform.
It is unclear whether the insights applied in this paper to measure the effects of Part D reform would be effective in measuring the impact of policy changes on mortality in other settings. Indeed, it may be that the unique features of the Part D insurance expansion led to identifiable effects on mortality (e.g., proven and effective drugs for treating cardiovascular conditions). However, we hope that the basic lessons learned in this study may lead to new insights for studying the effects of reforms on mortality across other settings. 64 We are scaling up the Engelhardt and Gruber estimate to the number of Medicare individuals over 65 in 2007. 65 For a more complete welfare analysis there are other factors that should also be considered. These include the moral hazard cost from the program inducing overconsumption and the cost of the government raising funds. If one considers that the marginal cost of drug production is near zero, then the welfare loss from moral hazard is quite limited. Dynamically, the analysis is more complicated since one needs to take into account the impact on drug development and the subsequent value of those drugs. This additional analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
